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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
evidence of criminal convictions in civil cases.16 However insupportable that rule may be, it is strongly entrenched judicially and
we may expect it to be relaxed only through legislation 7 upon the
very subject and not by remote implication.
Under the common law test of the instant decision an unlawful intentional non-felonious slayer would be barred from taking
the proceeds. While an unlawful intentional homicide, not felonious
in character, is not conceivable,"' yet if such a result could be
reached in the criminal trial, the statute as construed by the court
would not govern the distribution of the proceeds. Were the killing
unintentional the beneficiary should prevail both at law and in
equity.
-HOUSTON A. Sm=r.

Om AND GAS -

CONSTRuc iON OF DRmiL oR PAY COVENANT FOR

FURTHER DEVELOPEENT -

EFFECT OF PAYMNT OF DELAY RENTALs.

A covenant in an oil and gas lease required the lessee to drill a
well within one year, and if that well was a paying and producing
well which would deliver at least ninety thousand feet of gas daily
into the line, the lessee was to drill a second well within twentyfour months or pay rentals quarterly thereon. The first well was
drilled and produced gas. On being requested by the plaintiff
lessor, a year later, to take action under the covenant as to further
development, the lessee began paying rentals. The defendant who
had come into possession of the lease by assignment ceased payment, whereupon the plaintiff brought this suit for rentals due
and unpaid. HelU the covenant was operative if at any reasonable time after its completion, the first well was capable of delivering the required amount of gas into the line, but the payment of
rentals by the lessee constituted an election which bars the defendant from raising non-occurrence of the contingency as a de-

16 Interstate Dry Goods Stores v. Williamson, 91 W. Va. 156, 112 S. E. 301
(1922); Shires v. Boggess, 72 W. Va. 109, 77 S. E. 542 (1912). See Note
(1924) 31 A. L. R. 262.
17 The rule has not been frequently relaxed by judicial decision. In Eagle
S. & B. D. Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 142 S. E. 314 (1927), the court held
that the criminal judgment against the defendant is res adjudicataas to him
in the civil trial. See admitting such judgment as prima facie evidence in the

civil trial, but saying that further departures must be by legislation, Schindler
v. Royal Ins. Co., 258 N. Y. 310, 179 N. E. 711 (1932).
is An unintentional (i. e., a negligent) killing might be wrongful though not
necessarily felonious.
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fense after payment of seven rentals.

Hinder v. Southeastern

Gas Co."
Normally the lessee's duties in the matter of further develop2
ment are governed by an implied term of the lease. Occasionally
there is a provision in a lease requiring the drilling of additional
wells, but there is rarely provision for commutation through pay4
ment of rentals, 3 as in the covenant in the principal case.
The contingency on -which liability under this covenant depends is peculiar in that the usual broad requirement that the
test well produce in "paying quantities"r5 is modified by the specification of a minimum capacity of the test well. In defining the
term "paying quantities" in the more typical covenant, the courts
have kept in mind the obvious purpose of the parties, which is
to require the lessee to continue development only if the output
of the test well indicates that this may be done profitably. They,
therefore, hold that a well to be a paying well within the meaning
of such a provision should bid fair to repay the lessee, not only
his operating costs, but his drilling costs as well It would seem
that the mere specification of a minimum amount should not
change this term of the lease to the extent favored by the court
in the principal case. A construction whereby the contingency is
met if the test well is capable of producing the required amount
1177 S.E. 193 (W. Va. 1934).
2 SUrMrERS, Om AND GAs

(1927)

§

129 and eases cited thereunder; see

eases cited in Notes (1934) 93 A. L. R. 460; (1921) 14 A. L. R.959; (1934)
40 W. VA. L. Q. 175.
3 These provisions are usually inserted for the purpose of securing actual
development. "Desiring development of their property, the lessors declined
to execute a lease providing for delay and payment of commutation." Petty
v. United Fuel Gas Co., 76 W. Va. 268, 85 S.E. 523 (1915).
4The objection put forth in n. 3 does not apply in this instance since the
rental paid for commutation is equivalent to the amount the lessor would receive if a second well had been drilled.
5 This is the usual stipulation in this type of covenant. SUMERS, OIL AND
GAS § 124, n. 5. See for other examples: Kellar v. Craig, 126 Fed. 630 (C.
C. A. 4th, 1903); Manhattan Oil Co. v. Carrell, 164 Ind. 526, 73 N. E. 1084
(1905); Osburn v. Finkelstein, 189 Ind. 90, 126 N. E. 11 (1919); Swiss Oil
Co. v. Risuer, 223 Ky. 397, 3 S.W. (2d) 777 (1928) ; Aycock v. Paraffine Oil
Co., 210 S.W. 851 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919); Nystel v. Thomas, 42 S. W. (2d)
168 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
CA distinction is made between the meaning of the term "paying quantities" when it appears in a covenant for further development, as opposed to
the habendum clause as to whether drilling costs may be considered. Manhattan Oil Co. v. Carrell, supra n. 5; Osburn v. Finkelstein, supra n. 5;
Swiss Oil Co. v. Risner, supra n. 5; Ardizonne v. Archer, 72 Okla. 70, 178 Pae.
262 (1919); Pelham Petroleum Co. v. North, 78 Okla. 39, 188 Pac. 1069
(1920) ; Keechi Oil and Gas Co. v. Smith, 81 Okla. 266, 198 Pac. 588 (1921) ;
Young v. Forest Oil Co., 194 Pa. 243, 45 AtI. 121 (1899); Aycock v. ParafD GAS § 124; TionmTTON's LAW OF
tine Oil Co., supra n. 5; SUi Eas, Om
Om A N GAS (1925) § 149c.
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into the line for a short time only prevents this covenant from
being a reasonable term in the lease, making it comparable to a
mere wager. The fact that the covenant for further development
is in drill or pay terms should not cause the construction thereof
to be any less favorable to the lessee, for delay rentals are merely
commutation payments by way of excuse for not drilling, and
hence immaterial as to the question of the original duty to drill.7
It would seem, therefore, that the contingency should be said
to have occurred when the test well appeared capable of meeting
the minimum requirement and of producing over a long enough
period of time to reimburse the lessee for his drilling and operating
expenses.
In the principal case, however, the court refused to allow
the lessee to deny the occurrence of the condition. This ruling
might be based on the theory that the defendant has waived the
defence of non-occurrence of the contingency as the result of his
paying rentals, thus indicating an intent to consider himself bound.
The waiver would become binding through the change of position
on the part of the plaintiff, thereby induced, namely, his failure
to obtain evidence of the production capacity of the well.8 This
would seem to be sounder ground than either estoppel or election.
An estoppel is based on a representation of an existing fact 9
whereas the only representation here is as to future conduct. An
election is based on the theory that a party who has accepted
benefits under a deed, will, or contract should not be permitted
to repudiate it."0 It is difficult to see what benefit the lessee has
received in this instance that he would not have received were his
contention that the contingency had never occurred correct. Since
7 That rentals are not an equally important alternative performance seems
clearly inferable from the fact that the lessor is bound to accept them only
so long as there is no drainage. Trimble v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 113 W.
Va. 839, 169 S. E. 529 (1933); Carper v. United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 433,
89 S. E. 12 (1916); Stanley v. United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 793, 90 S.
R. 344 (1913); Note (1920) 26 W. VA. L. Q. 248.
s Waiver of requirement of performance of a condition precedent which
does not involve the actual consideration of the contract may be based on
words or conduct inducing reliance and a change of position by the other
party. Hukill v. Myers, 36 W. Va. 639, 15 S. E. 151 (1891); Peninsular
Land Trans. and Mfg. Co. v. Franklin Ins. Co., 35 W. Va. 666, 14 S. E. 237
(1891); Galloway v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 45 W. Va. 237, 36 S. E. 969
(1898); Houseman v. Home Ins. Co., 78 W. Va. 203, 88 S. E. 1048 (1916);
Piedmont Grocery Co. v. Hawkins, 87 W. Va. 38, 104 S. E. 736 (1920);
BIGELOW ON ESTOPPEL (6th ed. 1913) c. 19; 2 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
(1920) §§ 679, par. 3, and 689.
9BIGELOW ON ESTOPPEL § 636; WILLISTON ON CONRACTS § 1312.
1oBIGELOW ON ESTOPPEL c. 20; WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §§ 683-688.
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an election, where proper, will operate in the absence of reliance
and change of position by the other party," it would seem unwise
to employ that theory as the basis of this decision, for that lays
down a rule applicable to all cases where the lessee goes ahead
and pays rentals under a covenant for further development, and
this the court certainly could not have intended.
If the covenant is construed in the manner suggested above,
recovery on a waiver theory would be difficult to support, in that
there would not be the same paucity of evidence under the
requirement of a longer production period, and therefore no damage from the lessor's change of position.
-STPHEN

AS.

STRMEETS - DEDicAnoN By RECORDED PLAT - CONDITIONS. C real estate company platted a parcel of land into lots and
streets. Property was sold with reference to the recorded plat. Prior
to paving seven years later, which was the first recognition by the
municipality of the street in question as a public thoroughfare, 0
had constructed a railway on a part of the street. Subsequent to
this act of acceptance C quit-claimed its interests in the railway to
D railway company. The State Road Commission sued to compel
removal of the tracks to the extreme side of the easement to permit
enlargement of the street as a state highway. Held, before acceptance a dedicator can impose reasonable conditions which are
subject to public regulation and control. The condition here was
valid but the public interest warrants the issuance of a writ of
mandamus commanding the re-location of the tracks. State Road
Commission v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. (o.'
The court adopts the view in this case that the act of the
dedicator is nothing more than an offer to dedicate to public use
until the public authorities have manifested acceptance. The later
2
West Virginia cases would seem to support this conclusion, but
there are earlier decisions, which are, in effect, to the contrary.'
They have not been expressly overruled.
11 Nagle et al. v. Syer, 150 Va. 508, 143 S. E. 690 (1928) ; BiGELow ON EsTOPPEL c. 20; WILLISTON ON CoNTRAcTs § 686.
1177 S. E. 530 (W. Va. 1934).
2 Town of Glendale v. Glendale Improvement Co., 103 W. Va. 91, 137 S.
E. 353 (1927); City of Point Pleasant v. Caldwell, 87 W. Va. 277, 101 S.
E. 610 (1920).
3 City of Elklns v. Donohue, 74 W. Va. 335, 81 S. E. 1130 (1914); East
v. Railroad Co., 52 W. Va. 396, 44 S. E. 155 (1902).
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